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HAAS v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP.: MAKING THE CASE FOR
INCORPORATION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE INTO
THE LIMITATIONS STATUTE GOVERNING
DISCRIMINATORY DISCHARGE CLAIMS
In Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,1 the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land considered whether the statute of limitations in a discriminatory
discharge case commences upon an employee’s notice of discharge or
termination of employment.2  The court held that an employer’s dis-
criminatory act occurs, and a two-year statute of limitations starts,
upon actual cessation of employment.3  In so holding, the court im-
properly adopted a bright line rule that disregards the discriminatory
component of discriminatory discharges.4  To correct this shortcom-
ing in future cases, the Maryland General Assembly should amend sec-
tion 42(b)(1) of article 49B of the Maryland Code to ensure that
courts consider the time at which employees receive inquiry notice of
their employers’ wrongful motives.5  If the legislature adopts the dis-
covery doctrine in discriminatory discharge cases, it will implement a
flexible, proven scheme that enhances judicial administrability, pro-
motes consistency with recent Article 49B amendments, and protects
the financial wellbeing of employees.6
I. THE CASE
In October 1998, Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed)
hired Suzanne Haas to work as a program administrator in Lock-
heed’s Mission Systems division.7  For approximately the first year of
her employment, Haas received largely positive evaluations from her
supervisor, Katie Sterrett.8
In June 1999, however, Sterrett noticed, and Haas acknowledged,
that Haas struggled in her ability to pay attention to details.9  Accord-
ingly, Haas underwent a psychiatric evaluation in January 2000, which
Copyright  2008 by Kerry T. Cooperman.
1. 396 Md. 469, 914 A.2d 735 (2007).
2. Id. at 472–73, 914 A.2d at 737.
3. Id. at 494, 480, 914 A.2d at 741–42, 750.
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.C.
7. Haas, 396 Md. at 473, 914 A.2d at 737.
8. Id.  In particular, Haas achieved the level of performance required of new employ-
ees. Id.
9. Id.  These difficulties continued for several months. Id.
832
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yielded diagnoses of Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) and learning
disabilities.10  Several months later, Haas disclosed her medical condi-
tion to her new supervisor, Amy Lowenstein, and assured Lowenstein
that medication was alleviating her symptoms.11  In a June 2000 em-
ployee review, Lowenstein classified Haas as a “contributor” to
Lockheed.12
In April or May of 2000, as part of a restructuring at Lockheed,
Haas began to split her work hours between her Mission Systems posi-
tion and a new position in Lockheed’s Corporate Shared Services
unit.13  In the latter role, Haas reported to Candice Phelan, a supervi-
sor aware of Haas’s disability.14  Haas assured Phelan that her condi-
tion would not affect her job performance and Phelan expressed
confidence in their future working relationship.15
Despite these initial gestures of amicability, conflict arose.16  Ac-
cording to Haas, Phelan disparaged Haas’s work, reprimanded her for
minor deficiencies in performance, and suggested that she pursue a
different career.17  In April 2001, Phelan informed Haas that Lock-
heed had arranged to transfer Haas’s employment duties to a new
position in Lockheed’s Institute for Leadership Excellence (ILE).18
Haas applied for the ILE position, but Lockheed’s management
neither interviewed nor selected her for it.19
On June 11, 2001, Phelan issued a memorandum addressing what
she viewed as Haas’s underperformance, and placed Haas on a Per-
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 473–74, 914 A.2d at 737 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Lockheed’s
annual personnel evaluation is referred to as a “Contribution Assessment,” which rates
employees on a scale from one to five. Id. at 473–74 & n.2, 914 A.2d at 737 & n.2. On this
scale, “contributor” represents a three and “marginal contributor” represents a two. Id. at
474 n.2, 914 A.2d at 737 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Id. at 474, 914 A.2d at 738.
14. Id.  Specifically, Phelan was a supervisor in the Learning Services division of Lock-
heed’s Corporate Shared Services unit. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 474–75, 914 A.2d at 738.  Phelan purportedly suggested that Haas should
avoid tasks involving writing, mathematical calculations, judgment, computers, or detail.
Id. at 474, 914 A.2d at 738.  Further, Phelan allegedly sent Haas a job posting from outside
the company and reprimanded her for trivial errors, despite positive feedback from Haas’s
clients. Id. at 474–75, 914 A.2d at 738.
18. Id. at 475, 914 A.2d at 738.  The new ILE position was meant to serve the “logistical
and planning functions” that Haas had performed for Learning Services. Id.
19. Id.  ILE Director Dorothea Mahan stated in her deposition that “Haas lacked the
requisite experience in event planning” to occupy this position properly. Id.  Lockheed’s
management did not inform Haas that her application was unsuccessful “until shortly
before [Haas] received a notification of layoff.” Id.
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formance Improvement Plan (PIP).20  Haas disputed the memoran-
dum’s accuracy and alleged that Phelan ordered the PIP merely to
harm Haas’s standing at Lockheed and thwart her opportunity for
promotion.21  Although Phelan removed Haas from the PIP in Sep-
tember 2001 due to her improved performance, Phelan’s employee
evaluation of June 28, 2001 classified Haas as a “marginal contributor”
to Lockheed and highlighted deficiencies in Haas’s judgment, compli-
ance, attention to detail, and planning.22  Finally, Phelan sent Haas a
“Notification of Layoff,” dated October 9, 2001, stating that, effective
October 23, 2001, Haas’s employment at Lockheed would end.23
On October 22, 2003, Haas sued Lockheed in the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County, alleging disability discrimination relating to
her discharge.24  On November 1, 2004, Lockheed moved for sum-
mary judgment, asserting that Haas’s claim was time-barred by a two-
year statute of limitations that allegedly commenced when Haas
learned of her layoff.25  In opposition, Haas argued that she timely
filed her complaint, reasoning that the statute of limitations started
on her last day of work.26  In Maryland, a plaintiff must file a claim “in
the circuit court for the county in which the alleged discrimination
took place not later than 2 years after the occurrence of the alleged
discriminatory act.”27  Applying this law, the Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County granted summary judgment to Lockheed, holding
20. Id., 914 A.2d at 738–39.  The PIP is a formal disciplinary measure taken to guide
the improvement of an employee’s performance. Id., 914 A.2d at 738.
21. Id. at 476, 914 A.2d at 739.  Pursuant to Lockheed’s employment policies, no em-
ployee who is then the subject of a PIP is eligible for a promotion. Id. at 476 n.4, 914 A.2d
at 739 n.4.
22. Id. at 476, 914 A.2d at 739 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Haas disputed this
lower rating, arguing that Phelan had disregarded several positive reviews from clients with
whom Haas had worked. Id.
23. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The notice of termination explained that
the layoff was a “Reduction in Force,” and provided information about the company’s sev-
erance benefit plan and “outplacement services,” as well as the opportunity to complete an
exit interview. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Id. at 476–77, 914 A.2d at 739.  In particular, Haas alleged disability discrimination
under section 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code, the constitutionality of which Lock-
heed challenged through a motion to dismiss. Id.  The circuit court denied this motion.
Id. at 477, 914 A.2d at 739.
25. Id. at 477, 914 A.2d at 739–40. Lockheed also argued that (1) “Haas had not proven
in her complaint that she was improperly ‘regarded as’ being disabled by her supervisors
under Montgomery County Code § 27-6”; and (2) the decision to terminate Haas’s employ-
ment was a legitimate business act. Id., 914 A.2d at 740.
26. Id., 914 A.2d at 740.
27. MD. CODE ANN. art. 49B, § 42(a)–(b)(1) (2003).
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that the limitations period expired two years after Phelan notified
Haas of her discharge.28
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s deci-
sion.29  In its reasoning, the Court of Special Appeals relied on two
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, Delaware State
College v. Ricks30 and Chardon v. Fernandez,31 which, the court ex-
plained, focused on when a discriminatory act occurred.32  Analogiz-
ing Ricks and Chardon to the case at hand, the Court of Special
Appeals held that notice of discharge, not cessation of work, triggered
the limitations period.33  The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to
decide when the statute of limitations begins to run in an employee’s
discriminatory discharge claim under section 42 of article 49B of the
Maryland Code.34
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Persons in Montgomery County may file civil employment dis-
crimination claims if subjected to acts that the Montgomery County
Code (the County Code) prohibits, but may not do so earlier than
forty-five days after filing a complaint with the local agency that han-
dles violations of that county’s discrimination laws.35  Under the
County Code, an employer may not discharge anyone on the basis of a
“disability of a qualified individual.”36  A disability is “a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of an individ-
ual’s major life activities . . . or being regarded as having such an im-
pairment.”37  Under this state-county statutory scheme, a plaintiff
must file a discrimination claim “not later than 2 years after the occur-
rence of the alleged discriminatory act.”38
28. Haas, 396 Md. at 477, 914 A.2d at 740.
29. Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 166 Md. App. 163, 178, 887 A.2d 673, 682 (Ct.
Spec. App. 2005).
30. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
31. 454 U.S. 6 (1981) (per curiam).
32. Haas, 166 Md. App. at 176, 887 A.2d at 681 (citing Chardon, 454 U.S. at 7–8 (per
curiam); Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258).
33. Id. at 176–78, 887 A.2d at 681–82.
34. Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469, 472–73, 914 A.2d 735, 737 (2007).
The court specified that in resolving this issue, it had to address whether an act of discrimi-
nation occurs at the time the employee is notified of his or her upcoming discharge, or
when the employee actually stops working. Id. at 473, 914 A.2d at 737.
35. MD. CODE ANN. art. 49B, § 42(a), (b)(2) (2003).
36. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 27-19(a)(1)(A) (2005).
37. Id. § 27-6 (2007).  The term also specifically encompasses certain learning disabili-
ties. Id. § 27-6(3).
38. Art. 49B, § 42(a)–(b)(1).
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Because article 49B of the Maryland Code was patterned after ti-
tle VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act, Maryland courts generally look
to federal judicial interpretations of Title VII to interpret the meaning
of Article 49B.39  Specifically, the Supreme Court of the United States
has decided three Title VII cases that could influence how Maryland
courts construe the limitations period in section 42 of Article 49B.40
Although most states have adopted the Supreme Court’s notice of dis-
charge approach to identify the start of the limitations period for dis-
criminatory discharge claims, this approach is not binding on
Maryland courts.41  In fact, Maryland courts generally apply the dis-
covery rule to determine when a limitations period starts on private
civil claims in other contexts.42  Moreover, the Court of Appeals has
recently applied the discovery rule in a wrongful discharge case and
Maryland’s legislature has recently enacted pro-plaintiff amendments
to Article 49B.43
A. Maryland Courts May Consult Federal Case Law when Interpreting
Article 49B Because Article 49B Was Modeled on Title VII of
the Federal Civil Rights Act
Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act provides that employers
may not “discharge any individual” on the basis of race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin.44  Because article 49B of the Maryland
Code was patterned after Title VII,45 Maryland courts have sought gui-
dance from federal case law to resolve Article 49B claims46 and from
federal legislative history to determine the legislative intent behind
39. See infra Part II.A.
40. See infra Part II.B.
41. See infra Part II.C.
42. See infra Part II.D.
43. See infra Part II.E.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
45. Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 580, 770 A.2d 111, 119–20
(2001) (citing Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 632, 672 A.2d 608, 614 (1996)); see
also Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 607, 561 A.2d 179, 181 (1989) (noting
that (1) the Maryland General Assembly passed the session law that would become Article
49B in response to the enactment of Title VII; and (2) the General Assembly acted so
rapidly in doing so that Article 49B took effect one day before Title VII); State Comm’n on
Human Relations v. Mayor of Balt., 280 Md. 35, 40–42, 371 A.2d 645, 647–48 (1977) (ex-
plaining that the Maryland General Assembly amended Article 49B to conform the statute
to Title VII’s amendments).
46. See, e.g., Pope-Payton v. Realty Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 149 Md. App. 393, 402 n.6, 815
A.2d 919, 924 n.6 (Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (stating that Maryland courts “look to federal case
law interpreting Title VII” to analyze Article 49B claims (quoting Kohli v. LOOC, Inc., 103
Md. App. 694, 714 n.7, 654 A.2d 922, 932 n.7 (Ct. Spec. App. 1995))).
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Article 49B.47  For instance, in Molesworth v. Brandon,48 a female veteri-
narian sued for wrongful discharge in state court because her former
employer allegedly admitted to firing her due to her gender.49  To
understand whether Article 49B’s public policy supported the plain-
tiff’s claim, the Court of Appeals sought to define the meaning of “em-
ployer” within Article 49B.50  The court announced that “ ‘the cardinal
rule’” in construing a statutory word is to determine and effectuate
“‘the real legislative intention’” giving rise to the word.51  In further-
ance of this task, the Molesworth court turned to Title VII’s legislative
history “to discern the legislative intent behind” Article 49B.52  Simi-
larly, in Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,53 the Court of Appeals com-
pared Article 49B to Title VII where a chemist at a paint factory sued
for abusive discharge based on sex discrimination after her employer
fired her due to her pregnancy.54  Thus, when the words of Maryland
and federal rules are sufficiently similar, Maryland courts often look to
federal judicial interpretations to construe the state counterparts and
consider such interpretations persuasive.55  These interpretations,
however, are not binding on the Court of Appeals when it is analyzing
a Maryland rule.56
47. See, e.g., Molesworth, 341 Md. at 632–33, 672 A.2d at 614  (stating that because Arti-
cle 49B was patterned after federal law, Maryland courts may look to the legislative history
of Title VII to ascertain the legislative intent behind Article 49B (citing Chappell v. S. Md.
Hosp., Inc., 320 Md. 483, 494, 578 A.2d 766, 772 (1990))).
48. 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996).
49. Id. at 624–26, 672 A.2d at 610–11.
50. Id. at 630, 672 A.2d at 613 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id. (quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730, 731
(1986)).  To determine legislative intent, the Molesworth court explained that it looks first
at the plain language of the statute. Id. at 631, 672 A.2d at 613.  If the statutory language is
ambiguous or controversial, the court continued, it looks at “ ‘the entire statutory
scheme.’” Id. (quoting Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 41, 641 A.2d 870, 880–81
(1994)).  In that case, the court also stated that it examines any “‘other material that fairly
bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal.’” Id. (quoting Kaczorowski
v. Mayor of Balt., 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987)).
52. Id. at 633, 672 A.2d at 614.
53. 316 Md. 603, 561 A.2d 179 (1989).
54. Id. at 605, 623, 561 A.2d at 179–80, 189.  In particular, the employer told the preg-
nant employee that “she could not work at her job as long as she was pregnant and that her
pay and her medical benefits would stop until she became disabled because of her preg-
nancy.” Id. at 605, 561 A.2d at 180 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. See, e.g., Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706, 720, 870 A.2d 609, 617 (2005) (explaining
that judicial interpretation of a federal evidentiary rule provided guidance for judicial in-
terpretation of a Maryland evidentiary rule, given that the language of the two rules was
essentially the same).
56. Pinkney v. State, 350 Md. 201, 235, 711 A.2d 205, 222 (1998).
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B. Three Supreme Court Cases May Inform Maryland’s Interpretation of
the Statute of Limitations in Section 42 of Article 49B of the
Maryland Code
In Delaware State College v. Ricks57 and Chardon v. Fernandez,58 the
Supreme Court of the United States addressed federal claims related
to individuals’ employment and considered whether the applicable
statutes of limitations began to run upon notice of the employment
decisions at issue or upon actual cessation of employment.59  In Ricks,
a Liberian professor at Delaware State College (the College) claimed
that the College discriminated against him based on his national ori-
gin by denying him tenure.60  Reversing the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court
ruled that the limitations period started when the College notified
Ricks that he would not receive tenure, reasoning that the operative
discriminatory moment was when the College chose to deny him ten-
ure, not when Ricks stopped working.61
In Chardon, several non-tenured administrators in the Puerto
Rico Department of Education (the Department) sued after receiving
notices of termination from their employment.62  Reversing the deci-
sion of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and
applying the Ricks holding, the Chardon Court emphasized that the
Department had notified the administrators of their impending termi-
nations and that receipt of such notice could not delay the tolling of
the limitations period.63  Together, the Ricks and Chardon decisions
57. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
58. 454 U.S. 6 (1981) (per curiam).
59. See id. at 7–8 (granting certiorari to determine the onset of the statute of limita-
tions); Ricks, 449 U.S. at 254–56 (same).
60. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 252, 254.  Ricks had worked for several years on the College’s
faculty, after which the College offered him only a terminal, one-year contract. Id. at
252–53. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued Ricks a “right to sue
letter,” authorizing his discrimination claim. Id. at 254 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
61. Id. at 258, 262.  In other words, the Ricks Court explained that the important date
was that of the discriminatory act, not the date when the consequences of that discrimina-
tory act became “‘painful.’” Id. at 258 (quoting Abramson v. Univ. of Haw., 594 F.2d 202,
209 (9th Cir. 1979)).  Moreover, the Court analyzed “precisely the ‘unlawful employment
practice’ of which [Ricks] complain[ed]” and determined that Ricks had not alleged any
acts of discrimination between the time of his tenure denial and the time of his actual
discharge. Id. at 257.
62. Chardon, 454 U.S. at 6–7 (per curiam).
63. Id. at 7–8.  The Chardon Court reasoned that “[t]he fact of termination [was] not
itself an illegal act,” but rather a consequence of the illegal act. Id. at 8.  Additionally, the
Court explained that the administrators had not alleged the occurrence of any illegal acts
between the time when their employer decided to terminate their employment and the
time of their actual discharges. Id.
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are known as the “Ricks/Chardon [R]ule,” which stands for the proposi-
tion that a statute of limitations begins to run when the employer
gives the employee “final and unequivocal notice of an employment
decision having delayed consequences.”64
Recently, the Supreme Court decided Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.65 in a five-four opinion.66  In Ledbetter, the Court considered
the timeliness of a Title VII discrimination claim where, although the
employee received disparate pay within the limitations period, the em-
ployer’s discriminatory decisions as to the pay occurred outside the
limitations period.67  Invoking Ricks, the Ledbetter Court concluded
that the employee did not timely file her claim because the limitations
period commenced when the employer decided to pay the employee
lower wages and notified her of this decision.68  Notably, the Ledbetter
majority declined to consider the applicability of the discovery rule,69
which, under Maryland’s construction, provides that a limitations pe-
riod starts when a plaintiff knows, or should know, that a wrong oc-
curred.70  Some federal courts, however, have applied the discovery
rule to determine when the limitations period begins in Title VII em-
ployment discrimination suits.71
C. Although Most States Have Adopted the Ricks/ Chardon Rule, It Is
Not Controlling in State Courts
Although jurisdictions are split as to the propriety of the Ricks/
Chardon Rule, most states have adopted it in employment discrimina-
64. E.g., English v. Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957, 961 (4th Cir. 1988).
65. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
66. See id. at 2178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (listing Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer
as joining Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion).
67. Id. at 2166 (majority opinion).  The Court sought to discover “the specific employ-
ment practice” in dispute to determine when the limitations period commenced. Id. at
2167.  To pinpoint this moment, the Court explained the necessity of determining “when
[the] discrete unlawful practice” occurred. Id. at 2169.  Specifically, the Court made clear
that no new limitations period would start because of “subsequent nondiscriminatory acts
that entail adverse effects resulting from the past discrimination” because they would not
give rise to new Title VII violations. Id.
68. Id. at 2169.
69. Id. at 2177 n.10.
70. See Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 634–35, 431 A.2d 677, 679 (1981) (describ-
ing the discovery rule in the context of professional malpractice).
71. See, e.g., Ohemeng v. Del. State Coll., 643 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (D. Del. 1986) (stat-
ing that, under federal law, the limitations period for Title VII claims commences “‘when
the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that the discriminatory act has occurred’”
(quoting McWilliams v. Escambia County Sch. Bd., 658 F.2d 326, 330 (5th Cir. Unit B
1981))).
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tion cases.72  Several states, however, have rejected it in favor of an
approach under which discharge occurs and the limitations period
starts upon actual cessation of employment.73  Of these minority juris-
dictions, the high courts of Hawaii, California, and New Jersey have
written substantial opinions describing the arguments opposing the
Ricks/Chardon Rule.74
First, in Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawai’i),75 a hotel masseur sued
his employer, alleging discrimination based on marital status after the
hotel fired him for working with his wife in violation of a hotel policy
forbidding immediate relatives from working in the same depart-
ment.76  The Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the limitations pe-
riod began when the employee stopped work, reasoning that
“discharge” meant actual termination of employment.77  Second, in
Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc.,78 an employee sued a company
for age discrimination under the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act after the company terminated his employment.79  The
Supreme Court of California ruled that the limitations period started
72. See, e.g., Quicker v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 747 P.2d 682, 683 (Colo. Ct. App.
1987) (employing the Ricks/Chardon Rule); St. Petersburg Motor Club v. Cook, 567 So. 2d
488, 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (same); Humphreys v. Riverside Mfg. Co., 311 S.E.2d
223, 225 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (same); Allen v. Lieberman, 836 N.E.2d 64, 70 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005) (same); Keene v. Marion County Superior Court, 823 N.E.2d 1216, 1218 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005) (same), vacated on other grounds, 849 N.E.2d 1141, 1142 (Ind. 2006); Wagher v.
Guy’s Foods, Inc., 885 P.2d 1197, 1204–05 (Kan. 1994) (same); Eastin v. Entergy Corp., 865
So. 2d 49, 53–54 (La. 2004) (same); Turner v. IDS Fin. Servs., Inc., 471 N.W.2d 105, 107
(Minn. 1991) (same); Queensborough Cmty. Coll. of City Univ. of N.Y. v. State Human
Rights Appeal Bd., 363 N.E.2d 349, 350 (N.Y. 1977) (mem.) (same); Weber v. Moses, 938
S.W.2d 387, 393 (Tenn. 1996) (same); Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d
490, 492–93 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (same); Hinman v. Yakima Sch. Dist., 850 P.2d 536,
539 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (same); Naylor v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm’n, 378 S.E.2d
843, 845–46 (W. Va. 1989) (same); Hilmes v. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations,
433 N.W.2d 251, 253–54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (same).
73. See, e.g., Romano v. Rockwell Int’l, Inc., 926 P.2d 1114, 1122 (Cal. 1996) (rejecting
the Ricks/Chardon Rule); Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Haw.), 879 P.2d 1037, 1043–44 (Haw.
1994) (same); Collins v. Comerica Bank, 664 N.W.2d 713, 716 (Mich. 2003) (same); Al-
lison v. Jumping Horse Ranch, Inc., 843 P.2d 753, 756 (Mont. 1992) (same); In re Pritch-
ard, 627 A.2d 102, 103 (N.H. 1993) (same); Alderiso v. Med. Ctr. of Ocean County, Inc.,
770 A.2d 275, 277 (N.J. 2001) (same); Renegar v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 549 S.E.2d
227, 229 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (same); Oker v. Ameritech Corp., 729 N.E.2d 1177, 1179–80
(Ohio 2000) (same); Stupek v. Wyle Labs. Corp., 963 P.2d 678, 682 (Or. 1998) (same).
74. See infra notes 75–84 and accompanying text. R
75. 879 P.2d 1037 (Haw. 1994).
76. Id. at 1039.
77. Id. at 1044 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In other words, the Ross court ex-
amined the plain meaning of the statute and explained that such a bright line rule “fairly
accommodate[d] the interests of both employees and employers.” Id. at 1044–45.
78. 926 P.2d 1114 (Cal. 1996).
79. Id. at 1116–17.
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on his last day of work, citing the remedial purpose80 and plain lan-
guage of the statute, as well as the bright line rule’s simplicity and
limited burden on employers.81  Third, in Alderiso v. Medical Center of
Ocean County, Inc.,82 a nurse sued a medical center for retaliatory dis-
charge under New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act.83
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the statute of limitations
started “the day after” the last day of work because “discharge” meant
the last day of paid wages.84  Thus, as these opinions demonstrate, the
Ricks/Chardon Rule does not bind state courts’ interpretations of state
employment discrimination statutes.
D. Maryland Courts Generally Adhere to the Discovery Rule when
Determining the Moment at Which a Statute of Limitations
Begins to Run on a Private Civil Claim
Maryland’s general statute of limitations affords plaintiffs three
years to file claims.85  The limitations period commences when the
cause of action accrues.86  Historically, a cause of action accrued when
the wrongful act occurred and a claim was time-barred three years
later, even if the plaintiff had no reasonable occasion to know of the
act or its wrongfulness until long after it happened.87  According to
this rule, a victim who had “‘slumbered on his rights[ ]’” was
equivalent to a victim who was “‘blamelessly ignorant.’”88  Because
this approach was unduly harsh on claimants, the Court of Appeals
80. Id. at 1122–23; see also Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y of U.S. v. State Comm’n on
Human Relations, 290 Md. 333, 344, 430 A.2d 60, 66 (1981) (noting that the remedial
purpose of Article 49B was “to eradicate the vestiges of discrimination in the categories
designated”).
81. Romano, 926 P.2d at 1122–23.  The Romano court further reasoned that the Ricks/
Chardon approach “would promote premature and potentially destructive claims” because
it would require employees to file complaints while still employed, “thus seeking a remedy
for a harm that had not yet occurred.” Id. at 1123.
82. 770 A.2d 275 (N.J. 2001).
83. Id. at 277–78.  The plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim arose from her heated
disagreements with the medical center’s management over the treatment of five patients.
Id. at 278.
84. Id. at 277.  The Alderiso court ruled that its definition of discharge was the “ordinary
and logical meaning” of the word, and distinguished the Ricks and Chardon cases. Id. at
280–81.
85. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-101 (LexisNexis 2006).
86. See id. (“A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues
unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an
action shall be commenced.”).
87. Doe v. Maskell, 342 Md. 684, 689, 679 A.2d 1087, 1089 (1996).
88. Id. at 689–90, 679 A.2d at 1089 (quoting Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md.
324, 334, 635 A.2d 394, 399 (1994)).
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adopted the discovery rule.89  Under the discovery rule, the limita-
tions period starts when the plaintiff knows, or through due diligence
should know, of his or her potential claim.90  A plaintiff who invokes
this rule must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the date on
which he or she received this knowledge.91  The discovery rule is
meant to provide sufficient time for attentive plaintiffs to identify a
cause of action while ensuring fairness to defendants and promoting
judicial economy.92
Maryland courts have progressively broadened the applicability of
the discovery rule.  The Court of Appeals first applied the rule in
Hahn v. Claybrook,93 where a woman whose skin became discolored
from a prescribed medication sued her physician after the three-year
limitations period had expired.94  The Hahn court determined that
the limitations period started when Hahn discovered the discoloration
of her skin, which revealed the injury of which she could complain.95
More than six decades later, in Harig v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp.,96 the Court of Appeals extended the discovery rule to cases in-
volving dormant illness.97  In Harig, a woman sued an asbestos manu-
facturer, claiming that her fifteen-year exposure to asbestos-
containing products while working at an installation firm caused her
to develop cancer.98  Although the plaintiff did not discover her can-
cer until at least twenty years after her exposure to the asbestos, the
Court of Appeals applied the discovery rule, reasoning that “a person
89. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 634, 431 A.2d 677, 679 (1981).
90. Dual Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 383 Md. 151, 167–68, 857 A.2d 1095, 1104
(2004).  Under the discovery rule, knowledge means actual cognition or awareness implied
from “‘knowledge of circumstances which ought to have put a person of ordinary pru-
dence on inquiry . . . notice of all facts which such an investigation would in all probability
have disclosed if it had been properly pursued.’” Poffenberger, 290 Md. at 637, 431 A.2d at
681 (quoting Fertitta v. Bay Shore Dev. Corp., 252 Md. 393, 402, 250 A.2d 69, 75 (1969)).
91. Bacon & Assocs., Inc. v. Rolly Tasker Sails (Thail.) Co., 154 Md. App. 617, 633–34,
841 A.2d 53, 63 (Ct. Spec. App. 2004).
92. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 453–56, 550 A.2d 1155, 1165–67 (1988)
(analyzing the effect of the discovery rule on three policy considerations underlying a stat-
ute of limitations, including “(1) the interest of diligent plaintiffs to bring suit; (2) the
interest of defendants to enjoy repose after an unreasonable delay by plaintiffs; and (3) the
interest of society in promoting judicial economy”); Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md. 288, 297,
257 A.2d 421, 426 (1969) (explaining that the discovery rule gives a diligent plaintiff “the
full benefit of the statutory period in which to file suit, while at the same time protecting
the defendant from ‘stale claims[ ]’”).
93. 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917).
94. Id. at 184–85, 100 A. at 84–85.
95. Id. at 187, 100 A. at 86.
96. 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978).
97. Id. at 83, 394 A.2d at 306.
98. Id. at 72, 394 A.2d at 300–01.
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incurring disease years after exposure cannot have known of the exis-
tence of the tort until some injury manifests itself.”99
In Poffenberger v. Risser,100 the Court of Appeals declared that the
discovery rule is “applicable generally in all actions.”101  In Poffenberger,
a man who had been living in his new house for over three years sued
his homebuilder for negligence and breach of contract upon learning
that the house did not comply with certain building restrictions.102
The Court of Appeals ruled that the limitations period commenced
only when the homeowner knew, or reasonably should have known,
that the house was noncompliant.103  In deciding that the discovery
rule is generally applicable in civil cases, Poffenberger made the discov-
ery rule the usual rule in Maryland, rather than the exception.104
More recently, the Court of Appeals adjudicated Dual Inc. v. Lock-
heed Martin Corp.,105 where a subcontractor in the aircraft simulator
business sued Lockheed based on alleged torts relating to two con-
tracts.106  Although the Dual court ultimately found the plaintiff’s
claims to be time-barred, the court recognized that a limitations pe-
riod does not start until a plaintiff is at least “on ‘inquiry notice[ ]’” of
a potential claim.107  Inquiry notice occurs when (1) the plaintiff has
adequate facts to cause a reasonable person to inquire further; and
(2) a diligent investigation would indicate that the plaintiff is a
victim.108
99. Id. at 72–73, 80, 394 A.2d at 300–01, 305.
100. 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981).
101. Id. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 632–33, 431 A.2d at 678.  In particular, the house was eight feet from an
adjacent lot, despite a restriction providing that “no portion of any building . . . shall be
located within 15 feet of any other side lot line.” Id. at 633, 431 A.2d at 678 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. at 636, 638, 431 A.2d at 680–81.
104. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. R
105. 383 Md. 151, 857 A.2d 1095 (2004).
106. Id. at 157–58, 857 A.2d at 1098–99.  The plaintiff alleged that Lockheed colluded
to drive the plaintiff out of business in an effort to appropriate the plaintiff’s employees,
clients, and contracts. Id. at 158–59, 857 A.2d at 1099.
107. Id. at 167–68, 857 A.2d at 1104 (quoting Am. Gen. Assur. Co. v. Pappano, 374 Md.
339, 351, 822 A.2d 1212, 1219 (2003)).  The court further explained that, absent fraud, the
limitations period began when the plaintiff became aware that the contracts had been
terminated. Id. at 167–69, 857 A.2d at 1104–05.  The Maryland Code, however, provides
that a fraudulently concealed cause of action accrues only when the victimized party “dis-
covered, or by the exercise of ordinary diligence should have discovered the fraud.” MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-203 (LexisNexis 2006).
108. Dual Inc., 383 Md. at 168, 857 A.2d at 1104 (quoting Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314
Md. 433, 449, 550 A.2d 1155, 1163–64 (1988)).
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However, the discovery rule does not apply in every case.  In Doe
v. Maskell,109 for example, two women sued a parochial high school
alleging that the school’s chaplain repeatedly abused them when they
were students there approximately twenty-five years earlier.110  The
women claimed that “repression” of their memories made them una-
ble to recall the abuse until decades after their high school gradua-
tions.111  In ruling that the claims were time-barred and that the
discovery rule did not apply to cases of repressed memory, the Maskell
court stated that the discovery rule “must operate differently in differ-
ent contexts.”112
E. The Court of Appeals Has Adopted the Discovery Rule in a Wrongful
Discharge Case and the Maryland Legislature Has Recently
Enacted Pro-Plaintiff Amendments to Article 49B
Because the discovery rule is generally applicable to prevent in-
justice in all actions,113 the Court of Appeals recently applied the rule
in a wrongful discharge case.  In Arroyo v. Board of Education of Howard
County,114 the Court of Appeals considered when the limitations pe-
riod on a school guidance counselor’s wrongful discharge claim
against the Howard County Board of Education began.115  The Arroyo
court concluded that it began when the plaintiff “knew or reasonably
should have known of the claimed wrong done to him.”116
Title VII cases may also provide guidance as to the application of
the discovery rule in the context of employment discrimination.  In
109. 342 Md. 684, 679 A.2d 1087 (1996).
110. Id. at 686–88, 679 A.2d at 1088–89.  The chaplain allegedly threatened the girls
with “extreme punishments” if they told anyone about the abuse. Id. at 687, 679 A.2d at
1088.
111. Id. at 687–88, 679 A.2d at 1088–89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id. at 691, 695, 679 A.2d at 1090, 1092; see also O’Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 298,
503 A.2d 1313, 1322 (1986) (stating that the manner in which “the discovery rule operates
in different types of cases is for the court to determine”).  Specifically, the Maskell court
refused to apply the discovery rule because it equated repression of memory with forgetful-
ness, which does not delay the limitations period. Maskell, 342 Md. at 692, 695, 679 A.2d at
1090, 1092.
113. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981).
114. 381 Md. 646, 851 A.2d 576 (2004).
115. Id. at 649–50, 851 A.2d at 578–79.  In particular, Arroyo addressed the issue of when
the guidance counselor had exhausted his administrative remedies such that the statute of
limitations on his wrongful termination claim began to run. Id. at 650, 851 A.2d at 579.
116. Id. at 669, 851 A.2d at 590 (emphasis added).  Specifically, the “dispositive issue”
for the court was the time at which “the plaintiff was put on notice that he may have been
injured.” Id.  The Arroyo court decided that this moment occurred when the state board of
education affirmed the county board’s termination of the guidance counselor’s employ-
ment, given that this affirmance constituted the agency’s final decision and exhausted the
counselor’s administrative remedies. Id. at 671, 851 A.2d at 591.
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Merrill v. Southern Methodist University,117 for instance, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the limitations pe-
riod on a Title VII sex discrimination claim, citing Ricks for the pro-
position that a limitations period starts when the discriminatory act
occurs, and then explaining that the Fifth Circuit also looks at the
date when the claimant knew, or should have known, that a discrimi-
natory act had occurred.118  In light of these principles, the court re-
fused to delay the limitations period simply because a claimant has no
knowledge of the employer’s discriminatory motive at the time of the
act or upon learning of it.119
Finally, recent amendments to Article 49B provide a current legis-
lative context in which to assess whether the discovery doctrine should
apply to Article 49B discriminatory discharge cases.  In particular, on
April 24, 2007, Maryland’s governor signed a bill that amends Article
49B and affords several significant benefits to complainants, including
(1) authorization to allege discrimination in a private right of action,
and (2) increased damage awards.120  The former provision allows em-
ployees to bring their claims in county circuit courts if they “initially
filed an administrative charge or a complaint under federal, State, or
local law alleging a discriminatory act by the respondent” and at least
180 days have passed since that time.121  The latter provision allows
complainants to recover, among other awards, compensatory dam-
ages, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and expert witness fees.122
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the Court of Appeals reversed
the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in holding that an em-
ployment discharge occurs, and a two-year statute of limitations starts,
upon an employee’s actual termination.123  Writing for a five-two ma-
jority, Judge Harrell began by describing the statutory provisions un-
derlying Haas’s claim.124  First, the court noted that individuals in
Montgomery County may file discrimination claims under the Mary-
117. 806 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1986).
118. Id. at 602, 605.  In Merrill, a female professor filed Title VII claims against Southern
Methodist University, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and religion.  Id. at 602.
119. Id. at 605.
120. Act of Apr. 24, 2007, ch. 177, sec. 1, § 11B(a), (c)–(e), 2007 Md. Laws 788, 792–93
(codified at MD. CODE ANN. art. 49B, § 11B (Supp. 2007)).  The law took effect on October
1, 2007.  Art. 49B, § 11B editor’s note.
121. Art. 49B, § 11B(a)–(b).
122. Id. §§ 11B(c)–(e), 11D.
123. 396 Md. 469, 480, 494, 500, 914 A.2d 735, 741–42, 750, 754 (2007).
124. Id. at 479–80, 914 A.2d at 741–42.
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land Code.125  Second, the court stated that the County Code forbids
an employer from discharging any employee based upon a qualified
individual’s disability.126  Finally, the Haas court explained that an em-
ployee who seeks to sue under this system must do so within two years
of when the act of alleged discrimination occurred.127
Next, Judge Harrell stressed that the Ricks/Chardon Rule did not
bind the Haas court.128  Primarily, Judge Harrell emphasized that al-
though “Title VII is the federal analog to Art[icle] 49B” and although
Maryland courts traditionally consult federal case law when interpret-
ing Article 49B, Maryland courts are free to construe state statutes dif-
ferently from similar federal provisions.129  The Haas court
acknowledged that in both Ricks and Chardon, the Supreme Court de-
cided that the applicable limitations periods began when the employ-
ees had notice of the discriminatory acts, not at the time of actual
discharge.130  However, the Haas court also pointed out that the Ricks
holding was meant to apply only on a case-by-case basis and that states
had split views as to its propriety.131  Judge Harrell then explained that
the court would principally look to state appellate decisions to deter-
mine whether Maryland should adopt the Ricks/Chardon Rule.132
In so doing, Judge Harrell concluded that the Haas court should
reject the Ricks/Chardon Rule in favor of the minority approach that
the high courts of Hawaii, California, and New Jersey had devel-
oped.133  First, the Haas court cited Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co.
(Hawai’i)134 to highlight the following four assertions in opposition to
the Ricks/Chardon Rule: (1) the plain meaning of “discharge” is “termi-
125. Id., 914 A.2d at 741.
126. Id. at 480 & n.6, 914 A.2d at 741 & n.6.
127. Id. at 480, 914 A.2d at 741–42.
128. Id. at 481, 914 A.2d at 742.
129. Id. at 481 & nn.8 & 10, 914 A.2d at 742 & nn.8 & 10.
130. See id. at 484–85, 914 A.2d at 744–45 (acknowledging the federal courts’ position
that “‘[m]ere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of
a cause of action for employment discrimination’” (quoting Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449
U.S. 250, 257 (1980))).  Further, the Haas court pointed out that the claimants in Ricks and
Chardon had failed to allege that any discrimination occurred between the times of the
discriminatory decisions and the times of the actual discharges. Id., 914 A.2d at 744.
131. Id., 914 A.2d at 744–45.  The Haas court stated that although most states have
adopted the Ricks/Chardon Rule, many have done so without a comprehensive explanation,
or merely to preserve a “convenien[t]” statutory similarity between state law and Title VII.
Id. at 485–88, 914 A.2d at 745–46.
132. Id. at 486 n.12, 914 A.2d at 745 n.12.
133. See id. at 488, 491, 494, 914 A.2d at 746, 748, 750 (stating that the decisions of these
three courts were persuasive and “epitomize[d] best the arguments gainsaying adoption of
the Ricks/Chardon [R]ule”).
134. 879 P.2d 1037 (Haw. 1994).
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nation of employment”;135 (2) most employees do not learn of their
legal remedies until after they stop working; (3) courts should adjudi-
cate these claims on their merits because of the statute’s remedial pur-
pose; and (4) a last day of employment “bright line rule brings
certainty and simplicity” to the litigation process.136  Second, the Haas
court cited Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc.137 for the argument
that the Ricks/Chardon Rule encourages premature claims by improp-
erly requiring employees to sue while still working.138  Third, the Haas
court cited Alderiso v. Medical Center of Ocean County, Inc.’s139 definition
of “discharge” as “the last day of paid salary.”140  Thus, the Haas court
found that “the collective rationales” of the Hawaii, California, and
New Jersey decisions were “persuasive” in construing Maryland’s statu-
tory scheme.141
Finally, the Haas court assessed several additional points to bol-
ster its holding that a discharge occurs, and a limitations period be-
gins, on the date of actual termination.142  First, the Haas court
declared that if the legislatively intended meaning of Article 49B was
ambiguous, an interpretation grounded in “sound jurisprudential pol-
icy” would trump a “consensus interpretation.”143  Second, the Haas
court noted that the Ricks/Chardon Rule harms public policy that fa-
vors employer-employee conciliation by encouraging employees to
sue before they stop working.144  Third, the Haas court suggested that
135. Haas, 396 Md. at 489, 914 A.2d at 747 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In Ma-
ryland, Judge Harrell stated, plain meaning involves “the ‘ordinary, popular understanding
of the English language.’” Id. at 492, 914 A.2d at 749 (quoting Adventist Health Care, Inc.
v. Md. Health Care Comm’n, 392 Md. 103, 124 n.13, 896 A.2d 320, 333 n.13 (2006)).
Specifically, Judge Harrell cited four dictionaries in ruling that the plain meaning of “dis-
charge” was unambiguous. Id. at 492–93 & n.17, 914 A.2d at 749 & n.17 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  Judge Harrell further concluded that the definition of the word
“dismiss” clearly “rests on the sending away of an employee rather than a notification of
such an impending action.” Id. at 492 n.17, 914 A.2d at 749 n.17 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
136. Id. at 489, 914 A.2d at 747.
137. 926 P.2d 1114 (Cal. 1996).
138. Haas, 396 Md. at 489, 914 A.2d at 747 (noting the Romano court’s criticism that,
under the Ricks/Chardon Rule, employees would “seek[ ] a remedy for a harm that had not
yet occurred” (quoting Romano, 926 P.2d at 1123)).
139. 770 A.2d 275 (N.J. 2001).
140. Haas, 396 Md. at 490, 914 A.2d at 748 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Alderiso, 770 A.2d at 280).
141. Id. at 491, 914 A.2d at 748.
142. See infra notes 143–146 and accompanying text. R
143. Haas, 396 Md. at 493, 914 A.2d at 749–50.  Moreover, the Haas court asserted that
because section 42 of Article 49B is remedial in nature, courts should construe it “liberally
in favor of claimants seeking its protection.” Id. at 495, 914 A.2d at 750–51.
144. Id. at 496–97, 914 A.2d at 751–52 (noting that the Ricks/Chardon Rule may also
have “a chilling effect on the employee filing in the most timely manner”).
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the Ricks/Chardon Rule is not easily administrable because it requires a
“sometime[s] tortured analysis” using the discovery rule.145  In con-
trast, Judge Harrell asserted, the last day of employment approach
would (1) be “clear and logical” because employees do not typically
expect to have a cause of action while still working; and (2) ensure
that courts do not time-bar otherwise valid claims “for purely technical
reasons.”146  Thus, the Haas court rejected the Ricks/Chardon Rule in
favor of the minority approach that triggers the limitations period
when the employee stops working.147
Judge Battaglia wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion, joined in part
by Judge Raker,148 asserting that Maryland should adopt the Ricks/
Chardon Rule for five reasons.  First, Judge Battaglia argued that be-
cause Article 49B was deliberately patterned after Title VII, the Haas
court should have deferred to the Supreme Court’s precedent in this
area.149  Second, according to Judge Battaglia, the discriminatory act
was the employer’s “decision” to discharge.150  Judge Battaglia ex-
plained that Maryland’s statutory scheme emphasizes “ ‘the discrimina-
tory act,’” not the painful “ ‘consequences’” of that act.151  Third, Judge
Battaglia pointed out that different statutes and different facts moti-
vated the Hawaii, California, and New Jersey decisions on which the
Haas majority relied to reject the Ricks/Chardon Rule.152  Fourth, ac-
cording to Judge Battaglia, the last day of employment rule improp-
erly discourages employers from offering post-termination benefits
because it links the start of the limitations period to the cessation of
145. Id. at 497, 914 A.2d at 752.  In other words, the Haas court noted that “[a] signifi-
cant consideration supporting [its] conclusion . . . [was] the relative simplicity in applica-
tion of a bright line rule in this context.” Id.
146. Id. at 497–98, 914 A.2d at 752.
147. Id. at 494, 500, 914 A.2d at 750, 754.
148. Id. at 500, 914 A.2d at 754 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 503–04, 914 A.2d at 755–56 (reasoning that “[c]onsidering the mimicry of
state and local laws to Title VII, it is appropriate to consider federal precedents when inter-
preting state and local laws”).
150. Id. at 504, 914 A.2d at 756 (emphasis omitted).
151. Id. at 504–05, 914 A.2d at 756 (quoting Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981)
(per curiam)).
152. Id. at 505, 914 A.2d at 756–57.  For example, whereas the Ross plaintiff was subject
to a ninety-day statute of limitations, Haas was subject to a two-year statute of limitations.
Id., 914 A.2d at 757.  Whereas the Romano plaintiff had one and a half years notice of his
termination, Haas had two weeks notice of her termination, which would not have re-
quired her, or others like her, to sue while working. Id. at 505–06, 914 A.2d at 757.
Whereas the Alderiso plaintiff was subject to a one-year statute of limitations and given oral
notice of his discharge, Haas was subject to a two-year statute of limitations and afforded
written notice of her discharge. Id. at 506, 914 A.2d at 757.
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economic benefits.153  Last, Judge Battaglia stated that the majority’s
holding improperly disregarded Maryland’s longstanding discovery
rule.154  Thus, Judge Battaglia would have adopted the Ricks/Chardon
Rule to affirm the judgment that Haas did not timely file her claim.155
IV. ANALYSIS
In Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the Court of Appeals held that a
statute of limitations in an Article 49B discriminatory discharge claim
begins to run when the employee’s actual employment ends.156  Im-
properly focusing only on certain aspects of the meaning of a discrimi-
natory discharge, Judges Harrell and Battaglia incompletely defined
the statutory cause of action.157  The Maryland General Assembly
could remedy this shortcoming by amending section 42(b)(1) of Arti-
cle 49B to require courts to consider when an employee knew, or
should have known, of the alleged discrimination.158  If the legislature
adopts the discovery rule in this context, it would, among other bene-
fits, improve judicial economy, promote consistency with recent Arti-
cle 49B amendments, and protect the financial wellbeing of
employees.159
A. Haas’s Majority and Dissenting Opinions Incompletely Interpreted
Article 49B’s Cause of Action by Simply Focusing on Parts of
the Definition of a Discriminatory Discharge
Although the Maryland Code requires “an act of discrimina-
tion”160 and the County Code prohibits discharge based on a “disabil-
ity,”161 the Haas opinions did not fully assess the meaning of a
discriminatory discharge, each, instead, examining only one aspect of
this term.162  Judge Harrell consulted four dictionaries to conclude
153. See id. at 506–07, 914 A.2d at 757–58 (“The last-day-of-employment approach . . .
discourages employers from extending employment and other benefits beyond the date of
notification, which provides employees a much needed grace period to locate alternative
employment . . . .”).
154. Id. at 507–08, 914 A.2d at 758.
155. Id. at 510, 914 A.2d at 760.
156. Id. at 472–73, 494, 914 A.2d at 737, 750 (majority opinion).
157. See infra Part IV.A.
158. See infra Part IV.B.
159. See infra Part IV.C.
160. MD. CODE ANN. art. 49B, § 42(a) (2003).
161. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 27-19(a)(1)(A) (2005).
162. See Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469, 491–94, 914 A.2d 735, 748–50
(2007) (focusing only on the plain meaning of a “‘discharge’”); id. at 504, 914 A.2d at 756
(Battaglia, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the employer’s decision to discharge an employee
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that “discharge” means actual termination of employment.163  Judge
Battaglia decided that notice of termination substantiates an Article
49B claim because it is the employer’s decision to discharge an em-
ployee on the basis of discrimination that constitutes the statutorily
prohibited act of discrimination.164  However, both inquiries are defi-
cient because they give meaning to only part of what the statutory
scheme requires—an act of discrimination that the County Code for-
bids.165  In Haas’s case, the discriminatory act giving rise to her claim
was not discharge alone, but discharge “on the basis of [a] disability,”
namely ADD and learning disabilities.166  By defining discharge in a
vacuum, the majority opinion inadequately considered the discrimina-
tory component of Haas’s cause of action, and in adopting the notice
of termination rule, the dissent insufficiently addressed the fact that
Haas’s discharge, not just notice of it, constituted the unlawful act.
B. The Legislative Scheme Does Not Adequately Account for the Time at
Which an Employee Receives Inquiry Notice of the Claimed
Wrong
The General Assembly could ensure that future courts fully con-
sider the meaning of a discriminatory discharge, and achieve a more
just result, by amending section 42(b)(1) of Article 49B to incorpo-
rate the discovery rule.  Presently, section 42(b)(1) of Article 49B re-
quires that a claim be filed no later than two years after an “alleged
discriminatory act,” which includes an act, plus a discriminatory mo-
tive, plus knowledge giving rise to an allegation of wrongfulness.167
Unambiguously, in requiring a plaintiff to allege discrimination, the
statutory scheme makes it necessary for the claimant to possess knowl-
edge of an employer’s discriminatory motive.168  However, the current
language of the statute does not accommodate a claimant who cannot
obtain this knowledge of discriminatory motive until after the limita-
for a discriminatory reason, but ignoring the fact that the County Code prohibits an actual
discharge on the basis of a disability).
163. Id. at 492 & n.17, 914 A.2d at 749 & n.17 (majority opinion) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
164. Id. at 504, 914 A.2d at 756 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
165. See art. 49B, § 42(a) (“[A] person who is subjected to an act of discrimination pro-
hibited by the county code may bring and maintain a civil action against the person who
committed the alleged discriminatory act . . . .”); MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 27-
19(a)(1)(A) (making it a discriminatory employment practice for an employer to dis-
charge an employee on the basis of the “disability of a qualified individual”).
166. Haas, 396 Md. at 473, 476, 479–80, 914 A.2d at 737, 739, 741 (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Art. 49B, § 42(b)(1).
168. Id. § 42(a).
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tions period has expired, as might Arroyo’s inquiry notice standard,
which properly focuses on the moment the claimant had reason to
discover “the claimed wrong.”169  Under the discovery rule, Haas’s
cause of action would have accrued when Haas had reason to know
that Lockheed fired her based on her disability—the claimed
wrong.170  Thus, in stating that the limitations period runs for two
years after the discriminatory act, rather than two years after the em-
ployee receives inquiry notice of the discrimination, the statutory
scheme improperly triggers the limitations clock even if the employee
had no chance to learn she was a victim of discrimination.171
Further, contrary to Judge Battaglia’s assertion, the Ricks/Chardon
Rule’s notice of discharge approach does not “fit[ ] tongue and
groove with th[e] [c]ourt’s long adherence to the discovery rule.”172
Suggesting that notice of layoff satisfies the discovery rule improperly
assumes that notice of termination is the equivalent of notice of a
claimed wrong, here, a discharge on the basis of discrimination.173  In
fact, the Ricks/Chardon Rule is inconsistent with the discovery rule be-
cause although Ricks and Chardon require notice of the unlawful deci-
169. See Arroyo v. Bd. of Educ. of Howard County, 381 Md. 646, 669, 851 A.2d 576, 590
(2004).  Under Arroyo, the limitations period on a civil claim for wrongful discharge began
only when the plaintiff “knew or reasonably should have known of the claimed wrong done
to him.” Id.  In Maryland, this requires at least inquiry notice, which occurs when (1) the
plaintiff knows of enough facts to lead a reasonable person to investigate further; and (2) a
diligent investigation would show that the plaintiff is a victim.  Dual Inc. v. Lockheed Mar-
tin Corp., 383 Md. 151, 167–68, 857 A.2d 1095, 1104 (2004) (quoting Pennwalt Corp. v.
Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 449, 550 A.2d 1155, 1163–64 (1988)).
170. See Arroyo, 381 Md. at 668–69, 851 A.2d at 589–90 (stating that the plaintiff must be
on inquiry notice of “‘the wrong[ ]’” or “the claimed wrong done,” but describing the
wrong as the employee’s dismissal (quoting Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324,
334, 635 A.2d 394, 399 (1994))); Pennwalt Corp., 314 Md. at 455–56, 550 A.2d at 1167
(“[G]enerally, a cause of action for a plaintiff in a medical products liability action would
accrue when he knew or should have known (1) he suffered injury; (2) the injury was
caused by the defendant; and (3) there was manufacturer wrongdoing or a product
defect.”).
171. Compare art. 49B, § 42(b)(1), with Pennwalt Corp., 314 Md. at 455–56, 550 A.2d at
1167 (requiring a plaintiff to know of his or her injury, the source of the injury, and the
occurrence of wrongdoing before the cause of action would accrue).
172. Compare Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469, 507–08, 914 A.2d 735, 758
(2007) (Battaglia, J., dissenting), with Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct.
2162, 2177 n.10 (2007) (stating that the Supreme Court has “declined to address whether
Title VII suits are amenable to a discovery rule”).
173. See Hecht, 333 Md. at 334, 635 A.2d at 399 (explaining that prior to adoption of the
discovery rule, courts looked to when the wrong was committed and that such a rule
“wrought harsh consequences in cases where plaintiffs’ claims were barred, not only before
they were able to perceive any harm, but before it was possible for them to learn that the
negligence had taken place” (emphasis added)).
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sion, they do not require notice of the underlying discrimination,174
which is precisely what the claimant must allege to sue under Article
49B.175
As the Haas majority and dissenting opinions construed it, sec-
tion 42(b)(1) of Article 49B fails to contemplate that victims of dis-
crimination may have no reasonable chance to discover their causes of
action when they stop working or receive notice of discharge.  The
statute contains an inherent tension because, on the one hand, it is a
remedial statute designed to protect employees176 and, on the other
hand, it is a statute of limitations, which courts construe “strict[ly],” in
part, to protect employers against stale claims.177  To manage this
“delicate situation,” the Haas majority adopted the actual discharge
approach (1) to give employees adequate time to file claims; and (2)
to allow employers’ decisions regarding the discharge process to “con-
trol,” thereby ensuring their notice of potential claims.178  In contrast,
the Haas dissent sought to manage the tension by (1) authorizing em-
174. Compare Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (per curiam) (emphasizing
that the alleged unlawful act was the employer’s decision to terminate the claimant’s em-
ployment “solely for political reasons, violative of [his] First Amendment rights” and that
the important time, for statute of limitations purposes, was when the claimant received
notice of the employer’s final decision to terminate), Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,
258 (1980) (“[T]he only alleged discrimination occurred—and the filing limitations peri-
ods therefore commenced—at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated
to Ricks.”), English v. Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957, 961 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that, under the
Ricks/Chardon Rule, the limitations period “begins running on the date that the employee
is given definite notice of the challenged employment decision”), and Merrill v. S. Method-
ist Univ., 806 F.2d 600, 605 (5th Cir. 1986) (approving of Ricks and then declaring that a
statute of limitations may bar claims even if the claimant needs “years” to discover that a
“discriminatory animus” caused her harm), with Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284
Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299, 306 (1978) (applying the discovery rule and stating that “in
situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiff’s cause of action accrues
when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have
ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury”), and Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 512,
290 A.2d 530, 533 (1972) (explaining that, under the discovery rule, the limitations period
commences not on “the date of the wrong,” but rather, on the date the victim “discovers or
reasonably should have discovered that he has been wronged”).
175. See art. 49B, § 42(a) (authorizing an individual in Montgomery County to sue if
“subjected to an act of discrimination”).
176. See Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y of U.S. v. State Comm’n on Human Relations, 290
Md. 333, 344, 430 A.2d 60, 66 (1981) (“The legislature in enacting and amending Article
49B leaves no room to doubt its intent and purpose, i.e., to eradicate the vestiges of dis-
crimination in the categories designated.”).
177. Hecht, 333 Md. at 332–33, 635 A.2d at 399 (stating that Maryland uses “a rule of
strict construction concerning the tolling of the statute of limitations”); see also Romano v.
Rockwell Int’l, Inc., 926 P.2d 1114, 1119 (Cal. 1996) (noting that statutes of limitations are
meant to “protect defendants from the necessity of defending stale claims and [to] require
plaintiffs to pursue their claims diligently”).
178. Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469, 494, 498–99, 914 A.2d 735, 750,
752–53 (2007).
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ployees to file claims before actual discharge; and (2) triggering the
limitations period on notice of discharge, which, the dissent ex-
plained, offers enough time to diligent employees while also limiting
stale claims for employers.179  However, the discovery rule specifically
offsets the pitfalls of bright line tests in this circumstance—where
there is an inherent tension between the interests of plaintiffs and
defendants.180
Read together, these two approaches demonstrate that the statute
of limitations, as written, does not adequately accommodate employ-
ees who cannot reasonably discover that they are victims of discrimina-
tion until after they stop working.  Imagine, for example, a law firm in
Montgomery County that receives a staff attorney’s recent employee
health records, including genetic test results indicating a genetic de-
fect that is likely to cause pre-middle-age dementia.181  Immediately,
the firm’s managing partner decides to discharge the attorney due to
this diagnosis by phasing out the employee’s job duties over the next
year.182  Although the managing partner does not conceal his discrim-
inatory motives, the employee has no reasonable chance to learn of
them until three years after her last day of work, when a secretary
finds the following e-mail from the managing partner in the firm’s
computer archive: “I am glad we got rid of that staff attorney before
she lost her mind.”183  In this case, both Haas’s last day of employment
approach and Ricks/Chardon’s notice of discharge approach would
179. Id. at 507–08, 914 A.2d at 758 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
180. See Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md. 288, 297, 257 A.2d 421, 426 (1969) (noting that
the discovery rule gives diligent plaintiffs “the full benefit of the statutory period in which
to file suit, while at the same time protecting the defendant from ‘stale claims[ ]’”).
181. See generally Michael Kinsley, We Must Gather Courage to Discriminate Genetically, in
GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 840, 840–41 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006)
(discussing a hypothetical involving somewhat similar facts); Paul Steven Miller, Is There a
Pink Slip in My Genes?  Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y
225, 236 (2000) (describing a 1999 survey of 1,054 employers, which indicated that “ap-
proximately twenty percent of the employers surveyed obtained family medical history in-
formation of applicants, and twelve percent obtained family medical history information of
employees,” and further noting that a family medical history often reveals genetic
information).
182. See Miller, supra note 181, at 232 (explaining “the growing public concern over the R
use of genetic information for discriminatory purposes and . . . that some employers may
use information obtained from genetic testing to try to lower their insurance and sick leave
costs by screening out individuals who have traits linked to inherited medical conditions”).
183. The County Code provides that an employer may not discharge any individual on
the basis of genetic status. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 27-19(a)(1)(A) (2005).
Additionally, the Montgomery County Council has found that employers may improperly
use genetic status “as a proxy for otherwise illegal grounds for discrimination, . . . providing
a loophole in employment protections previously guaranteed by County law.” Id. § 27-1
editor’s note (2006) (quoting 2000 L.M.C., ch. 36, § 2(a)).
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time-bar the attorney’s discriminatory discharge claim under the
County Code before she had the chance to learn of the firm’s discrim-
inatory motive.184  Absent fraud, the legislative scheme would also
leave this staff attorney without remedy simply because she had no
reasonable way to timely discover that she was the victim of wrongdo-
ing.185  In contrast, the discovery rule would provide a remedy to the
hypothetical attorney and accommodate these concerns by delaying
the start of the limitations period until the employee received inquiry
notice of the wrongfulness of the employer’s conduct.186  Although a
statute of limitations is meant, in part, to afford defendants adequate
notice of claims so that they can gather and save evidence necessary
for their defense,187 incorporating the discovery rule into section
42(b)(1) of Article 49B would not undermine this purpose.  The dis-
covery rule would still trigger the limitations period when the claim-
ant had reason to identify his or her cause of action,188 which would
presumably occur when evidence of the discrimination still existed, as
in the above hypothetical.189  Thus, because the statute of limitations
does not consider the date on which an individual knew, or should
have known, about an employer’s discriminatory motive, and because
184. Compare Haas, 396 Md. at 494, 914 A.2d at 750 (announcing the court’s actual
termination holding, under which the hypothetical attorney’s claim would be time-barred
one year before she learned of the discriminatory e-mail), with id. at 502, 914 A.2d at 755
(Battaglia, J., dissenting) (discussing the notice of discharge approach, under which the
hypothetical attorney’s claim would be time-barred at least one year before she learned of
the discriminatory e-mail).
185. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-203 (LexisNexis 2006) (delaying the ac-
crual of the hypothetical attorney’s claim if the managing partner fraudulently concealed
or lied about facts material to the former’s discovery of her cause of action).
186. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 456, 550 A.2d 1155, 1167 (1988) (ex-
plaining, under the discovery rule, that a limitations period began when the plaintiff knew,
or should have known, of a manufacturer’s wrongdoing or the defective nature of a prod-
uct, in a products liability case).  The reasoning of case law concerning tort victims afflicted
with latent disease is also instructive in cases where an employee has no reason to know of
the employer’s discrimination until several years after the discriminatory act occurred. See
Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 80, 394 A.2d 299, 305 (1978) (“In
neither case can the tort victim be charged with slumbering on his rights, for there was no
notice of the existence of a cause of action.”).
187. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 256, 905 A.2d 340, 357–58
(2006).
188. E.g., Pennwalt Corp., 314 Md. at 456, 550 A.2d at 1167.
189. Moreover, if an employee knew, or had reason to know, of the employer’s discrimi-
natory motive on the last day of work, the discovery rule simply functions like Haas’s last
day of employment rule, which does not unduly burden the employer. Haas, 396 Md. at
498, 914 A.2d at 752 (“For employers, our holding makes clear how their record-keeping
and termination proceedings must be approached in order to defend properly against a
wrongful discharge action.  Employers are far less inconvenienced, if at all, by our holding
today than employees would be if we followed the Ricks/Chardon [R]ule.”).
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Maryland courts reject non-legislative equitable or implied exceptions
to statutes of limitations,190 the General Assembly should revise sec-
tion 42(b)(1) of Article 49B to incorporate the discovery rule.
C. The Discovery Rule Improves Judicial Administrability, Promotes
Consistency with Recent Article 49B Amendments, and Protects
the Financial Wellbeing of Employees
The Haas court applauded “the relative simplicity” of “a bright
line rule in this context” and dismissed the discovery rule’s “tortured
analysis,”191 even though the discovery rule promotes judicial econ-
omy and accuracy better than a bright line rule in several important
ways.  First, Haas’s optimistic view of its bright line test is largely un-
founded because, de facto, the last day of employment rule is not a
bright line rule at all.192  The Haas court expressly acknowledged that
its last day approach might be inappropriate in certain cases: “we
might entertain a renewed argument that Ricks and Chardon should be
followed in [some] circumstances.”193  By leaving the door wide open
for a Ricks/Chardon exception, the Haas court left parties uncertain as
to precisely when and on what grounds courts might depart from the
last day of employment approach.194  In contrast, the discovery rule is
the approach that is simple to apply because (1) litigants and state
court judges are already familiar with it; (2) its broad applicability al-
lows it to accommodate varying factual scenarios;195 and (3) it eases
190. Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 333, 635 A.2d 394, 399 (1994) (quot-
ing Booth Glass Co. v. Huntingfield Corp., 304 Md. 615, 623, 500 A.2d 641, 645 (1985)).
191. Haas, 396 Md. at 497, 914 A.2d at 752.  The Haas court noted with approval the
sentiment that “a bright line rule brings certainty and simplicity to an otherwise con-
founding decision of when an employee might be, or should have been, aware of his or her
cause of action.” Id. at 489, 491, 914 A.2d at 747–48.
192. See id. at 491 n.16, 914 A.2d at 748 n.16 (“Although we choose the [last day of
employment approach] in the present case, that may not necessarily be the case were we
confronted with a context similar to that found in Ricks and Chardon.”).
193. Id.
194. Cf. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America in Support of Respondent at 13, Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469,
914 A.2d 735 (2007) (No. 05) (arguing that a last day of employment approach “will create
great uncertainty regarding the future enforcement of Maryland’s discrimination laws, to
the detriment of the business community, the workforce, and the courts” due to the diver-
gence with federal law).
195. See, e.g., Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981) (hold-
ing, more than twenty-five years ago, that the discovery rule is generally applicable in any
civil case); see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-203 (LexisNexis 2006) (codifying
the discovery rule when the bad actor fraudulently conceals the cause of action from the
victim); Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 456, 550 A.2d 1155, 1167 (1988) (affirming
the use of the discovery rule in the interests of fairness and judicial economy, and charac-
terizing the rule as starting a limitations period when the plaintiff discovered, or should
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the administrative burden on courts by strictly requiring claimants to
demonstrate the date on which they discovered their claims.196  With
regard to flexibility, a limitations scheme like the discovery rule is es-
pecially appropriate because as genetic technologies expand, at least
one practitioner predicts that new legal issues, theories, and rules are
likely to emerge, potentially leading to wider-ranging times at which
discriminatory discharge victims discover their causes of action.197  As
for administrability, even if the discovery rule is less administrable
than Haas’s purported bright line, the Court of Appeals has expressly
stated that “[a]voiding possible injustice . . . outweighs the desire for
repose and administrative expediency, which are the primary under-
pinnings of the limitations statute.”198
Moreover, if the legislature embraces the discovery rule in dis-
criminatory discharge cases, doing so would preserve consistency with
recent pro-claimant amendments to Article 49B.  Practitioners predict
that the recent Article 49B amendments will cause more plaintiffs to
file claims because (1) Article 49B now provides increased damages;
and (2) Article 49B’s procedure now permits individuals to bring
claims in state court on their own.199  Although the private-right-of-
action amendment does not directly affect section 42 of Article
49B,200 both aspects of the amendment signal the legislature’s prefer-
ence for pro-claimant legislation in this area.  The discovery rule ad-
have discovered, his or her cause of action). But see Doe v. Maskell, 342 Md. 684, 691, 679
A.2d 1087, 1090 (1996) (explaining that the discovery rule “must operate differently in
different contexts”); O’Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 298, 503 A.2d 1313, 1322 (1986)
(noting that the manner in which “the discovery rule operates in different types of cases is
for the court to determine”).
196. See, e.g., Bacon & Assocs., Inc. v. Rolly Tasker Sails (Thail.) Co., 154 Md. App. 617,
633–34, 841 A.2d 53, 63 (Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (explaining that Maryland’s discovery rule
requires claimants to prove the dates on which they discovered their causes of action by a
preponderance of the evidence).
197. See Susan L. Crockin, Reproductive Genetics: Conceiving New Wrongs?, 3 SEXUALITY,
REPROD. & MENOPAUSE 37, 37–38 (2005), available at http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/
ReproGenConceivingWrongs.pdf (noting also that “the legal time limit for bringing claims
after genetic abnormalities are discovered is likely to expand”).
198. Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 80, 394 A.2d 299, 305 (1978).
199. Gil A. Abramson & Dean A. Romhilt, Presentation, Article 49B’s New Regime: The
Amendments to Maryland’s Anti-Discrimination Statute and What They Mean for Employers (Sept.
19, 2007), available at http://www.hhlaw.com/files/Event/a51fd1b2-d130-4cbb-ba2a-4f8d7
d483613/Presentation/EventAttachment/5df52070-04c3-43e5-8a83-92367b3ae838/Article
49BsNewRegime_Sept07.pdf.
200. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 49B, § 42(a) (2003) (providing a private right of action for
discriminatory acts, as prohibited by the County Code, separate from the private right of
action that the new amendment authorizes elsewhere in Article 49B).
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vances this legislative interest through its flexibility in affording
plaintiffs a sufficient opportunity to learn of a cause of action.201
Finally, the discovery rule protects the financial wellbeing of em-
ployees better than Haas’s majority or dissenting approaches by giving
employees sufficient time to realize their injuries and by preserving
the conciliatory process.  The discovery rule rejects the notion that the
doors of the judicial system should be closed to individuals who,
through no fault of their own, cannot timely discover their causes of
action.202  Additionally, both Haas approaches thwart the conciliatory
process between the employee and employer.  On the one hand, the
last day rule discourages employers from granting employees a grace
period to find new jobs or to collect post-employment benefits be-
cause such accommodations could delay the start of the limitations
period.203  On the other hand, the notice of discharge approach “frus-
trates” the conciliation process by “motivat[ing]” plaintiffs to sue
before their last day of work, “dooming any chance at conciliation.”204
In contrast, the discovery rule protects employees by providing as
much time as necessary for a victim to discover her cause of action.205
Further, the discovery rule aids the conciliation process by encourag-
ing employers who have not provided notice of their discriminatory
motives to reconsider their termination decisions.  Thus, for all of the
reasons explained above, the General Assembly should amend section
42(b)(1) of Article 49B to require courts to take into consideration,
when performing limitations analyses, whether an employee has no-
tice of an employer’s discriminatory motive.
201. See, e.g., Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 334–35, 635 A.2d 394,
399–400 (1994) (describing Maryland cases that have utilized the flexible and plaintiff-
friendly features of the discovery rule).
202. See, e.g., Arroyo v. Bd. of Educ. of Howard County, 381 Md. 646, 668, 851 A.2d 576,
589 (2004) (explaining the pitfalls of an approach merely focused on when the actual
wrong took place).
203. See, e.g., Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[A] rule focusing
on the date of termination of economic benefits [i.e., the last day of work approach] might
dissuade an employer from extending benefits to a discharged employee after the em-
ployee had ceased working.”).
204. Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469, 496–97, 914 A.2d 735, 751–52
(2007).
205. See, e.g., Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 80, 394 A.2d 299, 305
(1978) (“In cases where the initial injury is inherently unknowable, however, the statute of
limitations should not begin to run until the plaintiff should reasonably learn of the cause
of action.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
In Haas v. Lockheed Martin, the Court of Appeals held that a two-
year statute of limitations in a discriminatory discharge claim begins
to run when employment ends.206  In doing so, the court insufficiently
considered the discriminatory element of a discriminatory dis-
charge.207  To correct this problem, the General Assembly should
amend section 42(b)(1) of Article 49B to acknowledge the practical
reality that victims of discriminatory discharges do not realize that
they have claims until they discover that their discharges were based
on discrimination.208  If the legislature incorporates the discovery rule
in this context, it would, among other benefits, improve judicial econ-
omy, promote consistency with recent Article 49B amendments, and
protect the financial wellbeing and legal expectations of litigants.209
KERRY T. COOPERMAN
206. Haas, 396 Md. at 472–73, 480, 494, 914 A.2d at 737, 741–42, 750.
207. See supra Part IV.A.
208. See supra Part IV.B.
209. See supra Part IV.C.
